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There Shall Be "One Supreme Court"
By ARTHUmR J. GOLDBERG*

In discussing the proposal for a National Court of Appeals' (the
Mini-Supreme Court) I start, as one must, with the Constitution of
the United States. Article I, section 1 of the Constitution states:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court .

. ."

Opponents of the proposed National Court of Appeals

have argued that the creation of such a court would violate this article
in that a delegation of the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would create, in effect, two Supreme Courts.2
To some extent, Congress can alter the specific substantive areas
that fall within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. But once Congress
vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, can it delegate to another court
responsibility for deciding cases which are properly filed in the Supreme Court? Does not the power to decide cases presuppose the
power to consider them and to make a final decision with respect to
them when properly filed? In other words, is delegation to another
court of cases properly before the Supreme Court consistent with the
Constitution's command that there be "one supreme Court"?
Even if these constitutional doubts are not well-founded, what the
Constitution does not command, it may still inspire. There is the
greatest value in citizens being able to believe that, as a matter of
principle, every person has a right to take a claim involving basic rights
and liberties to the Supreme Court of the United States for final action,
without reference to any other tribunal. It is this belief that in part
inspires the great popular belief of the Supreme Court as a palladium of
liberty and a citadel of justice.
*

Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

1. See FEDERAL JuDiIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE
LOAD oF THE SUPRE E COURT (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT].
2. See, e.g., Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEw REPUBLiC, Feb. 10, 1973,
at 14; Warren, A Response to Recent Proposals to Dilute the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 20 LOYOLA L. REV. (NEw ORLEANS) 221, 229 (1974).
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The controversy relating to the mini-court commenced on December 19, 1972 with the release of a Federal Judicial Center study
group report, popularly known as the Freund Report. 3 Mr. Freund,
a distinguished Harvard professor and constitutional scholar, and his
colleagues on the study group recommended a major change in the
structure of our judicial system. After examining the workload of the
Supreme Court, the group concluded that the rising caseload has imposed a "staggering burden" upon the justices. 4 The group proposed
that Congress create a new National Court of Appeals, made up of a
rotating panel of seven presently sitting federal appellate judges. This
new court would screen the 4,000 or so petitions for review that are
now filed each year with the Supreme Court; the great majority would
be finally denied, but about 400 petitions would be certified to the
Supreme Court itself for further screening and disposition. The new
court would also hear and determine on the merits cases involving conflicts among the federal courts of appeal, a function traditionally performed by the Supreme Court.5
There were other recommendations in the Freund Report which
did not arouse the same degree of controversy: the abolition of threejudge courts in special cases with direct appeal to the Supreme Court;6
and the establishment of an ombudsman, rather than an untutored
prison lawyer to advise prisoners as to their prospects of success in
seeking review by the Court.As a result of the considerable opposition to the Freund Report's
recommendations, Congress created the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System. s This distinguished commission
heard testimony, sponsored studies, and on June 20, 1975 submitted
its report and recommendations to Congress for change in the structure and internal procedures of the federal appellate system.9 In this
commentary I shall not deal with the part of the commission report
regarding the internal procedures of the existing courts of appeal. I
shall confine myself to the commission's recommendations affecting
the Supreme Court.
3.

FR uND REPORT, supra note 1.

4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 18-19.
6. Id. at 27.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L No. 92-489, §§ 1-7, 86 Stat. 807, as amended,
Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (1974).
9. U.S. COMMISSION ON REvISION OF THE FEDERAL CouRT APPELLTE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975) [here-

inafter cited as COMMISSION

REPORT].
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The commission recommended that Congress establish a National
Court of Appeals, consisting of seven judges appointed by the president
with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 0 The National Court of
Appeals would have jurisdiction to screen or hear cases (a) referred to
it by the Supreme Court (reference jurisdiction), or (b) transferred to
it from the regional courts of appeal, the Court of Claims, and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (transfer jurisdiction)."With respect to any case before it on petition for certiorari, the
Supreme Court would be authorized:
(1) to retain the case and render a decision on the merits;
(2) to deny certiorari, thus terminating the litigation;
(3) to deny certiorari and refer the case to the National Court
of Appeals for that court to decide the merits of the case; or
(4) to deny certiorari and refer the case to the National Court
of Appeals, giving that court discretion either to decide the case on
the merits or to deny review. 12
If a case filed in a court of appeals, the Court of Claims, or the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is one in which an immediate
decision by the National Court of Appeals is in the public interest, it
may be transferred to the National Court of Appeals provided it falls
within one of the following categories:
(1) the case turns on a rule of federal law and the federal courts
have reached inconsistent determinations with respect to it; or
(2) the case turns on a rule of federal law applicable to a recurring factual situation, and a showing is made that the advantages
of a prompt and definitive determination of that rule by the National
Court of Appeals outweigh any potential disadvantages -of transfer; or
(3) the case turns on a rule of federal law which has theretofore
been announced by the National Court of Appeals, and there is a substantial question about the proper interpretation or application of that
rule in the pending case.'"
The National Court of Appeals would be empowered to decline
the transfer, and decisions by the National Court of Appeals accepting
or rejecting cases would not be reviewable under any circumstances.' 4
Any case decided by the National Court of Appeals, whether upon refer10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

30.
32, 34.
32-33.
34-35.
35.
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ence or after transfer, would be subject to review by the Supreme Court
upon petition for certiorari.1 5
The underlying rationale of the commission's report is that the
Court is overburdened and as a consequence is unable adequately to
deal with transcendent constitutional issues, to resolve conflicts between the circuits, and to determine national law authoritatively and
efficiently.
The recommendations of the commission have, in the main, received the support of the Chief Justice of the United States, Mr. Justice
White, Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice
Marshall have, by and large, opposed the recommendations of the commission as did Mr. Justice Douglas while he was on the Court. 6
Almost everyone who has sat on the Supreme Court has agreed that
three-judge courts with direct appeals to the Supreme Court should be
abolished 7 and that federal diversity jurisdiction also should be terminated.
Let me first deal with the question of the "staggering burden" on
Supreme Court justices. During my tenure, the Court's caseload was
not as heavy as it is today; filings have increased from approximately
2,400 during the 1962 term to approximately 4,000 during the 1974
term.' 8 Although the number of filed cases that the Court must screen
has risen dramatically, I am of the view that certiorari petition screening, though highly important, represents one of the less time-consuming
aspects of a justice's work. The vast majority of certiorari petitions raise
no significant legal issue, and under existing legislation, the Court has
discretion to deny petitions without a hearing or a formal opinion.
Indeed, an astonishing number of filed cases present questions that a
third-year law student can immediately recognize as inappropriate for
the Supreme Court.
The more historically important and time-consuming aspect of a
justice's work-the hearing and determination of cases on the meritshas not become correspondingly more burdensome over the years. The
number of decided cases has remained relatively constant, averaging
about 150 annually during recent times.' 9
15. Id. at 38.
16. See id. at 172-88.
17. Recent legislation has eliminated three-judge courts except in cases challenging
the constitutionality of the apportionment of legislative districts and a few other cases.
Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 2284, 2403, 45 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 12, 1976).
18. FnEuND REPORT, supra note 1, at A2.
19. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
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I frankly do not see how the recommendations of the commission
would diminish the workload of the Supreme Court. Rather it seems
that were this procedure to be adopted, the workload of the Supreme
Court would be increased. The Court would be required to undertake
review of certiorari cases twice: first, on the original application for
certiorari, and subsequently after the National Court of Appeals decides these cases on the merits or by denial of review.2"
The commission apparently hopes that the Supreme Court would
allocate less time and work for the second review than it did for the
first. But my experience teaches that some, or even all, of the Supreme
Court justices would conclude that a second review similar to the first
probably would be necessary in fairness to the litigants and in discharge
of the Court's responsibility. It seems to me unlikely that the Supreme
Court by rule would dispense with the first review in particular cases
or in groups of cases.
The commission's referral proposal seems to imply that the Supreme Court should concern itself primarily with constitutional issues,
and that the National Court of Appeals should deal with other important issues of national law and conflicts between the. regional circuits. Yet Supreme Court justices are interested in various areas of the
law, and rightly so. Questions of statutory interpretation are illustrative of the scope of appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court. I doubt very much that the proposed procedure would materially alter the Court's decision-making process with respect to certiorari
application of these kinds of cases.
I further adhere to the view that resolving conflicts between the
circuits and therefore necessarily overruling a particular court of appeals
is a sensitive process even when performed by the Supreme Court. To
vest this function in a court of lesser stature than the Supreme Court,
however distinguished it may be, would inevitably create tension in
the appellate system. Further, the Supreme Court often delays resolution of a conflict situation until the problem is ripe for adjudication.
In summary, it is my belief that the recommendations of the commission would not alleviate the workload of the Supreme Court, but
would add to it. Despite the disclaimer of the commission, its recommendations would create a "fourth tier" in our federal judicial system,
leading to greater delays and greater expense than now exist. The
proposed transfer jurisdiction for the National Court of Appeals like20. Id. at 32-38.
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wise seems unrealistic. The commission obviously hopes that in both
reference and transfer jurisdiction the Supreme Court would refuse to
review decisions and actions of the National Court of Appeals except
in the most summary fashion. I do not conceive that regional courts
of appeal would readily yield their jurisdiction except to the Supreme
Court. 2
It is perhaps the greatest virtue of the Supreme Court that it is
designed to serve, as it now functions, as a guarantee to all citizens 'of
whatever estate, race or color that our highest court is open for consideration of their claims that they are being denied equal and relevant
justice under the Constitution. I am convinced that grave injury would
be done by creation -of a National Court of Appeals to the great concept
engraved at the very entrance of the noble edifice which houses the
Court: Equal Justice Under Law.
*Ibelieve that to create a National Court of Appeals would be a
serious mistake. The commission's proposal, if implemented according
to its intent, would deny to Americans their historic right to take any
case raising substantial constitutional questions or significant matters
of national law to the highest court in the land for final resolution by the
Supreme Court and by the Supreme Court alone. I profoundly believe
that the Supreme Court as it now functions is discharging its great
responsibilities as the ultimate guardian of our liberties under the
Constitution. Let us maintain the purpose and spirit of the institution.
21. The proposed transfer jurisdiction has been eliminated in S. 3423, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976), introduced by Senator Hruska, the chairman of the commission.
Senator Hruska correctly states in his explanatory statement relating to this proposal
that it has aroused intense and widespread dissent. My own discussions with various
judges of the courts of appeals and others confirm this statement by Senator Hruska.
It is my opinion that elimination of transfer jurisdiction in S. 3423 is well advised.

